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Abstract 
 
  
Political corruption is a type of market failure. One area of public 
policy where corruption is relatively common is the contracting out 
of public services. Private firms can improve their chances of 
obtaining contracts by bribing politicians or public servants and 
funding political parties. In the same vein, firms can gain access to 
policy makers by hiring influential former politicians –a practice 
commonly referred to as revolving-doors. In Spain, a number of 
corruption cases, involving all the major political parties, are 
presently under judicial investigation. Some of these cases involve 
water contracts. Also, there is evidence showing that private firms 
have been funding political parties as well as hiring former 
politicians for top positions. In this paper, we use information from 
892 privatizations of water services in Spanish municipalities 
between 1984 and 2014 and logistic multinomial regression 
techniques to study the association between specific firms securing 
contracts and the political parties ruling the municipalities. We find 
evidence of a systematic association between the Popular Party 
(Partido Popular or PP) and the firm, Aqualia, part of the large Spanish 
holding company, Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC), which 
is known to have funded the PP. Furthermore, former PP politicians 
have been appointed to top positions in the FCC board of directors. 
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POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, CORRUPTION, AND PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC 
SERVICES: EVIDENCE FROM CONTRACTING OUT WATER SERVICES IN SPAIN 
1. Introduction 
Political corruption is a type of non-market failure (Wolf, 1979), which negatively 
affects investment and growth (Mauro, 1995; Beekman, G. et al., 2014; Serritzlew et 
al., 2014) and innovation (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Although more evident in 
developing countries, corruption affects all countries to some extent (OECD, 2007; 
Transparency International, 2014; Hessami, 2014), and it is still a matter of 
controversy whether corruption increases or decreases with decentralization (Fan, 
Lin, Treisman, 2009; Oto-Peralías, Romero-Ávila, Usabiaga, 2013). One of the 
fields most closely linked to political corruption is that of privatization of public 
services (Hart et al., 1997). Regardless of how the concession process is structured, 
some companies secure public service contracts in exchange for kickbacks. This 
practice is contrary to the public interest, because it does not guarantee that the 
best-performing company is awarded the contract. This is therefore likely to lead 
to inefficiency (Dal Bó, & Rossi, 2007) and extra service delivery costs (Dastidar & 
Mukherjee, 2014), which will ultimately be borne by users or by taxpayers (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). In short, it adversely affects the expected social welfare of an 
auction (Boehm & Olaya, 2006). 
The financing of political parties has been a controversial issue in Spain since the 
reestablishment of democracy. It is recognized that the rules on financing of 
political parties establishes too restrictive a framework for obtaining resources, 
and creates a system that is overly dependent on government subsidies (Pujas & 
Rhodes, 1999; Casal et al., 2014). Some authors argue that tighter financing 
regulations stimulate corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Sajo, 1998). In fact, this 
has been used in Spain as an argument to explain why political parties have 
irregularly obtained resources at some point (Bel et al., 2014). Thus, from the 1990s 
the parties have been investigated by judiciary courts and by the Court of 
Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas) over events such as the cancellation of political 
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parties’ bank debts, corporate donations, and bribery. In this context, according to 
Ariño (2009), decisions related to the procurement of public services are one of the 
main sources of political corruption in Spain. 
There are reasonable grounds for doubt as to the existence of systematic bribery 
in procurement of water service in Spain. On one hand, scholars and politicians 
recognize that party funding regulations in Spain have been very restrictive. 
Legally, most of the funding comes from government transfers. Donations are 
limited to €60,000 per donor, and the contributions by party members are largely 
insignificant. Furthermore, the processes for awarding contracts are not 
characterized by transparency and independence. The lack of transparency was 
partially addressed some years ago by the Law 30/2007 on public sector 
contracts. However, external control is insufficient, and the entire hiring process 
is under the control of local government itself. Finally, an additional problem is 
the difficulty faced by the judiciary in obtaining evidence of malpractice, and the 
lengthy judicial processes that go on for ten years or more. An index recently 
developed by the RAND Corporation (Stanley et al., 2014) assesses aspects such as 
the expectation of bribes and the anti-bribery laws, and ranks Spain as one of the 
developed countries with the highest risk of bribery. 
In this framework, our research analyzes the possible existence of favorable 
treatment by the main Spanish political parties to the private companies that are 
the leading actors in urban water service management in Spain. In the 
international arena, several authors have warned of corruption cases involving 
water companies and political parties (Lobina, 2005; Hall & Lobina, 2007; Hall et 
al., 2013). Our hypothesis is that political parties might be seeking illegal funding 
for their activities in exchange for systematically favoring certain firms in the 
process of awarding water service contracts. This is a reasonable suspicion in 
Spain if we take into account the many cases that are currently under judicial 
investigation for alleged corporate payments in exchange for preferential 
treatment in the awarding of public contracts for water service management 
(Global Water Intelligence, 2013). 
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2. Literature review 
The study of rent-seeking has long been a key element in the analysis of the 
motivations of government's decisions. In his seminal paper, Stigler (1971) 
discusses financial support for electoral campaigns, and funding for the 
bureaucratic tasks of the political party machinery as potential demands that 
governing parties can make in exchange for regulation in favor of specific 
industries or firms. Shleifer & Vishny (1993) argue that the design of institutions 
and the political process are important determinants of the level of corruption. 
More closely related to public services delivery, Hart et al. (1997) show that the 
policy makers engaging in rent-seeking are incentivized to create 
overemployment when public services are delivered in-house, thus engaging in 
political patronage and obtaining political support. Conversely, if service delivery 
is contracted out, rent-seeking politicians will tend to obtain financial resources 
(rather than over-employment). These financial resources can be used to fund 
political activities (elections and party machinery), for personal enrichment, or 
both at the same time. 
There is relevant theoretical literature on bribery in procurement processes 
(OECD, 2007; Celentani & Ganuza, 2002; Burguet & Che, 2004; Menezes & 
Monteiro, 2006; Burguet & Perry, 2007; Koc & Neilson, 2008; Lengwiler & 
Wolfstetter, 2010), but available evidence is extremely scarce. In fact, the main 
problem when investigating bribery in public procurement is the difficulty of 
obtaining evidence. This is because there is no legal market for corruption and 
bribery and so those involved hide this illegal activity. A methodological 
approach to investigate the relationship between bribery and public procurement 
is through questionnaires, but the results tend to underestimate the scale of the 
corruption (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006; Olken, 2009). More recently, Buchner et al. 
(2008) and Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2012) propose an experimental study to 
induce the behavior of agents, but this method of analysis also has limitations 
(Guala, 2005; Ortmann, 2005). 
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The empirical works tend to focus on the political factors explaining the extent of 
corruption and its political effects, and typically use judiciary inquiries and media 
scandals as data. In the case of Spain, Costas-Pérez et al., (2012) analyze local 
corruption in 1999-2007 and find that average vote loss after a corruption scandal 
was around 4 percent, and –interestingly– punishment is more severe when there 
has been intense media attention. Jiménez & García (2012) analyze local 
corruption in 2000-2011 and find that corruption increases (although moderately) 
voter abstention, and also has partisan effects. Costas-Pérez (2014) finds that 
repeated corruption cases promote abstention, and that voters with no attachment 
to any political party are the only ones that withdraw from elections because of 
corruption, while parties’ core supporters do not modify their electoral 
participation. Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2014) find that corruption scandals 
have a marked negative effect on trust in local politicians, particularly among 
citizens with no strong party attachment (to the party in question) and who 
follow media news more frequently. A more recent paper by González Lopez-
Valcárcel et al. (2015) analyzes whether there are mimetic effects between 
neighboring municipalities and finds some contagious effects of corruption. 
Our research takes a different path. We analyze the potential relationships 
between the successful tenderers for the water service and the governing political 
parties in the town when the contest is granted. The study centers on 892 
agreements to privatize water services management made by local governments 
in Spain between 1984 and 2014. The methodology used is multinomial logistic 
regression. Our results show evidence of a significant association between the 
frequency of specific firms obtaining (or not) the contracts, and the presence of a 
specific political party in government. In this way, we contribute to the literature 
by providing evidence of systematic bias in awarding contracts, depending on the 
governing political party in the municipality. 
 
5 
 
3. A short review of judicial investigations, suspicions of bribery and political 
connections related to contracting of local public services in Spain. 
When Spaniards these days are surveyed about Spain’s problems, corruption is 
revealed to be a major concern (Schwab, 2014; European Commission, 2014). 
Suspicions of corruption and judiciary investigations affect many areas of public 
policy and virtually all political parties that have held significant government 
positions in the last decades. Within this context, there are many cases of 
procurement under investigation by the Spanish judiciary for alleged bribery. A 
number of contracts are under judicial investigation, such as those relating to the 
Gürtel Case, the Púnica Operation, and the Pokemon Case (also known as the 
Bárcenas Case), 1  among others. In these cases, investigations focus on major 
business groups that operate in Spain. For instance, within the investigation of the 
Gürtel Case, a judiciary writ issued by the Spanish Audiencia Nacional –one of 
Spain’s highest judicial bodies– (Juzgado de Instrucción Central n. 5; Writ of 
November 26, 2014, pp. 94–95) presents indicia that a concessionaire owned by 
Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC) and SUFI Group did pay commissions 
in exchange for local services contracts in the municipality of Majadahonda 
(Madrid), which was governed by the Popular Party. 
Furthermore, within the investigation of the Bárcenas Case it has been proved that 
large business groups did supply large amounts of money to the Popular Party. 
Between 2002 and 2009, FCC contributed €5.03 million to the Popular Party, 
making it the second largest donor after the public works company Sacyr, which 
contributed about €6 million.2 Indeed, José María Mayor Oreja, former president 
of FCC’s construction division and brother of Jaime Mayor Oreja, minister in the 
Popular Party central government between 1996 and 2001, admitted before Judge 
                                                 
1 This case has been named the Bárcenas Case after Luis Bárcenas, who was Manager (1982-1987, 
1993-2008) and later Treasurer (2008-2009) of the Popular Party, and also member of the Senate for 
this party (2004-2010). The Popular Party holds the central government in Spain, as well as most 
regional and local governments. 
2  See details in Huffington Post, 11 May 2014 (http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2014/11/05/ 
hacienda-caso-barcenas_n_6108430.html); and Europa Press, 11 May 2014 (http://www. 
europapress.es/nacional/noticia-barcenas-hacienda-cree-no-hay-correlacion-temporal-
donaciones-pp-contratos-publicos-20141105165940.html). 
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Ruz (Audiencia Nacional, investigation into the Bárcenas Case) that he had made 
financial contributions to the Popular Party.3 
Within the water distribution sector itself, numerous cases of bribery have been 
subject to judicial investigation. Those cases have been frequent enough as to be 
the object of a report issued by Global Water Intelligence (Global Water 
Intelligence, 2013), which provides extensive information on judiciary inquiries 
affecting the two major water distribution firms in Spain, Aqualia and Agbar, as 
well as minor firms such as Emarsa and Aguas de Valencia.4 In addition to ongoing 
cases at different stages of legal proceedings, other contracting cases have been 
denounced by opposition political parties, alleging irregularities of various kinds. 
Moreover, we must keep in mind that, due to the hidden nature of criminal 
activity, there may well be a number of bribery cases that remain unseen. 
Finally, mention has to be made of the common practice of revolving-doors 
between politics and big business in Spain, as documented by Castell & Trillas 
(2013, pp. 109–110). This practice means that politicians holding high positions in 
government are subsequently appointed as members of the Board of Directors of 
large firms that have regulatory or contractual relations with the government, 
after they have withdrawn from institutional political activities. Within the 
context of this study, it is worth recalling that two prominent former members of 
the Popular Party were members of the FCC Board of Directors at the end of 2014 
(FCC, 2015, p. 3). One was Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, minister in the Spanish 
government (1976-1980) and first Popular Party candidate elected to the European 
Parliament in the 1989 election. He was later appointed Commissioner of 
Transportation and Energy for the European Commission (1994-1999), a job 
which he was put forward for by the Popular Party. The second was Gustavo 
Villapalos Salas, who had formerly been minister of Education, Culture, and 
                                                 
3  See El País, 28 May 2013 (http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/28/actualidad/ 
1369751484_277881.html). 
4 Judicial inquiries and investigations have been set up with respect to concessions awarded to 
Aqualia in Andalusia and Castile-La Mancha, to concessions awarded to Agbar in Galicia and 
Asturias, and to concessions awarded to Acciona in Castile-La Mancha. Different political parties 
were involved in cases affecting each firm. 
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Sports (1995-2001) in the regional government of Madrid, under the ruling of the 
Popular Party. It is also interesting to note that in 2001, Abel Matutes was 
appointed to the FCC Board of Directors just after being minister of foreign affairs 
in the Popular Party’s first government (1996-2004). He was a member of that 
board for most of the last decade. No such political connections with former 
members of governments exist in the Boards of Directors of others firms in the 
urban water delivery sector; neither in Agbar5 –the other dominant firm–, nor in 
other firms with lesser market share. 
The question we address is whether the sum of the cases under legal proceedings, 
cases reported by local opposition parties, and the unknown number of 
unrecognized cases, are isolated cases of corruption caused by some members of 
municipal governments seeking illicit enrichment; or, on the contrary, if it is 
conceivable that this reflects a more complex plot, in which members of municipal 
governments act on the instructions of their political party to finance its activities. 
The hypothesis to be tested is the existence of a systematic relationship between 
companies that win privatization contests, and the political party that holds the 
municipal government. If there are indeed significant relationships, these could 
be interpreted as evidence of favoritism that should be investigated, given the 
possible use of bribery to illicitly finance political parties. 
4. Privatization of urban water management in Spain 
4.1 Legal framework 
In Spain, municipal governments are responsible for the urban water supply, and 
they can choose between different forms of service delivery6, which are set out in 
the current legislation. First, the municipal government may choose to manage 
the service in-house (the government itself manages the service) or to externalize 
                                                 
5 Actually, five out of the seven members of Agbar’s Board of Directors are French. Its Executive 
President has never had any involvement in institutional activities. 
6 The regulation of the management of municipal services in Spain is set out in Law 7/1985 (Local 
Government Regulations) and Law 57/2003 (Measures for the Modernization of Local 
Government). 
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it. Externalization can be effected by means of transferring delivery to a 
government-owned company (public firm), or privatizing it. In case of the latter 
option, privatization can be either partial, by means of a mixed firm (institutional 
public-private partnership, PPP), or full, whereby the service is contracted out to 
a private firm (contractual public-private partnership).7 
The comparative prevalence of different delivery forms varies widely between 
Spanish regions. In the last decades concession agreements have increasingly 
been used by municipal governments (Bel, 2006). By means of concession 
agreements, municipal governments award a public services management 
contract to a private firm. The government usually retains the ownership of the 
assets and the ultimate responsibility for the service, while the private firm 
manages the service during the term of the contract.8 After a competitive bidding 
process, the water service management is awarded to a private company for a 
fixed period of time. This period of time cannot exceed 25 years in management-
only contracts, but contracts involving the construction and operation of 
infrastructure can extend to 50 years. 
The bidding process develops as follows: first, an announcement of the public 
tender of the contract is made, which includes the technical and economic 
conditions of the contract and the procedure and assessment criteria. Details are 
also given on the commitments that must be fulfilled by the private firm awarded 
the contract. In light of all that information, private firms place a first-price 
sealed-bid, in which bidders must submit their technical and financial proposal. 
Finally, the municipal government awards the contract to the firm that made the 
best proposal with respect to a number of criteria. 
                                                 
7 Although private firms sometimes own the water system assets in Spain, this is very unusual. 
For instance, among the large cities, Barcelona is the only such case. 
8  Partial privatization, by means of mixed firms, is also becoming increasingly common. 
Ownership is shared between the government, who usually retains ownership of a large fraction 
of the firm’s capital and is expected to ensure the public interest, and the private partner, who has 
know-how of the industry and is often in charge of the day-to-day management (Warner & Bel, 
2008, González-Gómez et al., 2009). 
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4.2. The urban water industry in Spain: Evolution and current situation  
The participation of the private sector in the management of urban water supply 
in Spain is among the largest in the OECD countries, as a percentage of the 
population served, second only to France (Pérard, 2009).9 According to González-
Gómez et al. (2014), in 23 percent of Spanish municipalities urban water supply is 
delivered via one of the forms of private management referred to in the legal 
system. However, this percentage rises to 55 percent when expressed in terms of 
population. This is indicative of the concentration of the privatization process in 
the more populated municipalities. Cities where private companies –whether 
fully private or partially private– deliver the water service have an average 
population of 14,008 inhabitants, whereas cities where urban water is managed by 
the public sector have an average population of 3,416 inhabitants. 
After the entry into force of Law 7/1985 (Local Government Regulations), many 
Spanish municipalities decided to privatize the management of water services. 
The main motivations for water privatization in Spain have been pragmatic and, 
to a lesser extent, ideological and political (González-Gómez et al., 2011; Picazo-
Tadeo et al., 2012). These results align closely with those obtained in Bel & 
Fageda's (2009) meta-regression analysis to explain local privatization decisions. 
One of the features of the Spanish model of privatization is the high concentration 
of private participation in a few dominant firms. Data obtained from our 
fieldwork shows that Agbar –an acronym of Aguas de Barcelona– and Aqualia 
groups are involved in the management of 67 percent of the municipalities that 
have privatized the delivery of urban water service. In terms of population, these 
two companies control 75 percent of the private part of the industry. It is worth 
recalling that our figures are quite similar to those obtained by Bel (2006, p. 246), 
which showed that in 2003 Agbar and Aqualia together made up 72 percent of the 
concessions, and served 82 percent of the population. Clearly, the market 
                                                 
9 Private ownership of the water system assets is the general rule in England and Wales, and also 
in the Czech Republic. 
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structure of the water industry in Spain is characterized by an oligopoly with two 
dominant companies. Furthermore, these companies are integrated into two 
major business groups. 
Agbar is a subsidiary of the French holding Suez Environment. It comprises over 
150 companies and around 13,000 employees, and provides water services not 
only in Spain but also in countries such as the United Kingdom, Mexico, China, 
Chile, Cuba, Colombia and Algeria; moreover, this company operates under 
diverse denominations in different Spanish regions.10 Aqualia belongs to Fomento 
de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC), a group that used to be controlled by the 
Spanish Koplowitz family, until Inmobiliaria Carso (owned by the Mexican 
magnate Carlos Slim) bought a 25.6 percent ownership stake in FCC in late 2014 
(FCC, 2015), thus becoming the major shareowner. In addition to providing water 
services to more than 850 Spanish municipalities, this holding company is also 
present in more than 50 countries, including China, Mexico, Portugal, the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Algeria. 
Another notable feature of the Spanish model of urban water services provision is 
the regional specialization of the private part of the industry. Although these 
leading firms have a presence throughout Spain, over time they have 
strengthened their positions in certain geographical areas. Agbar has a leading 
position in Catalonia and a major presence in the provinces of Alicante, Murcia, 
Granada and Ciudad Real, among others. Aqualia has a greater presence in the 
municipalities of the Andalusian coast, Toledo and Badajoz. Meanwhile, there are 
a few private firms of a markedly local nature, such as Aguas de Valencia in the 
province of Valencia, Facsa in the province of Castellón, Prodaisa in Girona, and 
Espina & Delfín in Galicia. 
                                                 
10 These are Aigües de Barcelona in the metropolitan area of Barcelona and Sorea in the rest of 
Catalonia; Aquanex in Extremadura; Aquara in Aragon; Aquarbe in Cantabria, Basque Country and 
La Rioja; Aquaona in Castile-La Mancha and Castile and León; Asturagua in Asturias; Canaragua in 
the Canary Islands; Hidralia in Andalusia; Hidraqua in the Valencian Community; Hidrobal in the 
Balearic Islands; Hidrogea in Murcia; and, finally, Viaqua in Galicia. 
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5. Data and methodology 
5.1. Variables, data and sources 
In this paper, we use information from 892 privatizations of the urban water 
service that occurred in Spain between 1984 and 2014. Given that our aim is to 
shed some light on why local governments choose one particular firm over other 
alternatives, the first variable of interest is the name of the firm to which the 
contract was awarded. 
As already noted, private firms, either contractual or institutionalized PPPs, 
manage the urban water service in approximately 1,800 Spanish municipalities in 
2014. It is worth noting that until 2008 there was no public register with 
information about contracting procedures of local services in Spain. From April 
30th 2008, however, the Law 30/2007 on public sector contracts required local 
administrations to create an institutional webpage named Contractor Profile, which 
is aimed at ensuring transparency and affording public access to the information 
relating to the contractual activity of public administrations. Accordingly, from 
this date onwards, when a local government privatizes the management of a 
given service it must grant public access through the abovementioned webpage to 
all information related to the privatization. We have thus made use of this 
resource to collect information about privatizations taking place after Law 
30/2007 was passed, and particularly the name of the firm awarded the contract 
for the urban water service provision. 
In addition, we submitted postal or electronic requests to local councils that had 
privatized the service before that time, asking them for the date of the town 
council plenary session in which the decision to privatize was taken. We then 
referred to municipalities’ Official Gazettes to obtain the name of the provider of 
the urban water service. Furthermore, in a few cases, we obtained this 
information directly from the webpages of the town councils. 
12 
 
Taking the two abovementioned sources together, we have collected information 
about 892 privatizations of the urban water service that occurred in Spanish 
municipalities during the period 1984-2014, which represent nearly 50 percent of 
total privatizations. 
For the purpose of our research, we have firstly established three possible options 
for the firm chosen to privatize the urban water service, namely, Aqualia, Agbar 
and Others. The group Others includes all firms other than those included in the 
first two groups, e.g., firms that operate at national level such as Acciona, Agua & 
Gestión, Gestagua, Hidrogestión, Urbaser and Valoriza, in addition to some 
companies that, as mentioned, operate mainly at regional level, including Aguas 
de Valencia, Facsa, Prodaisa and Espina & Delfín. Table 1 shows the shares of each 
one of these three alternatives in terms of the total privatizations included in our 
sample for the whole period 1984-2014. We also identify the political party ruling 
the local government at the time when the decision to privatize was taken. 
 
Table 1. Privatizations of the urban water supply in Spanish municipalities, 1984-2014: 
Frequencies in the sample (number of cases; percentage in brackets). 
Firm Total 
Political party ruling the local government 
PSOE PP Others 
Aqualia 304   (34.1) 153   (39.7) 107   (36.4) 44   (20.8) 
Agbar 301   (33.7) 120   (31.1) 71   (24.1) 110   (51.8) 
Others 287   (32.2) 113   (29.2) 116   (39.5) 58   (27.4) 
TOTAL 892 (100.0) 386 (100.0) 294 (100.0) 212 (100.0) 
Source: Authors 
 
In our sample, Aqualia was chosen to privatize the urban water service 304 times 
(34.1 percent), the Agbar group 301 times (33.7 percent), while firms included in 
the group Others were chosen 287 times (the remaining 32.2 percent). Both of the 
two biggest Spanish political parties, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español or PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP) have awarded more 
contracts to Aqualia than the average that this firm obtained all over Spain, while 
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the opposite happens in the case of Agbar, to which PSOE, and particularly PP, 
have awarded a lower percentage of contracts than the share of contracts that 
Agbar has obtained all over Spain. 
Secondly, we have selected two sets of variables aimed at explaining the choice of 
the firm selected to privatize the urban water service, relating to some features of 
the municipality, and also to the party in power of the local government at the 
time the decision was made. On the one hand, the control variables related to the 
municipality that privatizes the urban water service include Population, measured 
as the number of inhabitants in 2012 and taken from the Spanish Statistical Office 
(INE); Economic activity, measured by the indicator of economic activity provided 
for Spanish municipalities by La Caixa (2014). And, lastly, sixteen geographical 
dummies with a value equal to 1 if the municipality belongs to the regions of 
Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Canary Islands, 
Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and León, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, 
Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja and the Valencian Community, and 0 otherwise.11 
On the other hand, the political variables intended to capture the effect of the 
party in power in the local government are the following: PSOE, which is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the left-wing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party was in 
power when the decision to privatize was taken and 0 otherwise; and PP, which 
takes a value of 1 if the right-wing Popular Party was ruling the local government 
at the time of privatization and 0 otherwise. In both cases the data come from the 
Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. Majority is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the party in power, either PSOE or PP, held a majority when the 
decision to privatize was taken, and 0 otherwise; this variable is defined by the 
number of city councillors, with data from the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Finally, Continuity is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the decision to privatize 
was taken in the second or a subsequent term of office of the party ruling the 
town council. Table 2 presents some basic statistics of these variables. 
                                                 
11 In this respect is it worth highlighting that these dummies represent all Spanish regions except 
Navarra, for which we have no observations in the sample. 
 
 
Table 2.- Sample description: Explanatory variables 
 All Aqualia Agbar Others 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Population (inhabitants) 17,765 35,610 19,556 35,097 20,391 42,936 13,137 26,103 
Economic activity (no dimension) 30.28 77.75 31.88 72.58 36.19 97.58 22.43 56.32 
Andalusia 0.299 - 0.392 - 0.182 - 0.138 - 
Aragon 0.022 - 0.013 - 0.026 - 0.027 - 
Asturias 0.017 - 0.019 - 0.033 - 0.000 - 
Balearic Islands 0.012 - 0.013 - 0.003 - 0.020 - 
Basque Country 0.006 - 0.006 - 0.013 - 0.000 - 
Canary Islands 0.019 - 0.023 - 0.029 - 0.003 - 
Cantabria 0.030 - 0.013 - 0.019 - 0.059 - 
Castile-La Mancha 0.152 - 0.191 - 0.099 - 0.166 - 
Castile and León 0.057 - 0.062 - 0.093 - 0.013 - 
Catalonia 0.162 - 0.066 - 0.295 - 0.125 - 
Extremadura 0.058 - 0.075 - 0.043 - 0.055 - 
Galicia 0.054 - 0.026 - 0.063 - 0.076 - 
Madrid 0.002 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.006 - 
Murcia 0.034 - 0.042 - 0.029 - 0.031 - 
La Rioja 0.006 - 0.013 - 0.003 - 0.003 - 
Valencian Community  0.122 - 0.039 - 0.063 - 0.270 - 
Political variables         
PSOE  0.423 - 0.504 - 0.398 - 0.392 - 
PP 0.329 - 0.349 - 0.235 - 0.406 - 
Majority 0.665 - 0.663 - 0.641 - 0.694 - 
Continuity 0.681 - 0.716 - 0.691 - 0.482 - 
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5.2. A brief methodological note 
In order to formalize the choice of the firm selected to privatize the urban water 
service, represented by the variable Y, we use multinomial logit regression 
techniques (see Greene, 2012: 763–766 for details). In particular, we compare the 
probability that municipality i selects firm m to privatize the urban water service, 
where m = Aqualia and Agbar, against the base category which is set to Others. In 
formal terms: 
    (1) 
where Municipalityi and Politicali are two vectors of variables capturing features of 
the municipality and political variables related to the party in power of the local 
government, respectively. The parameters to be estimated are the constant , and 
the vectors mk and mh. 
The expression (1) has been fitted by maximum likelihood using Stata 13 software, 
with robust standard errors to account for the presence of heterogeneity in the 
sample. In addition, and provided that the coefficients from the multinomial logit 
do not have a direct interpretation, i.e., they are relative to the base outcome, we 
have computed the marginal effects that measure the effect of changing the value 
of each explanatory variable on the probability of observing a given outcome, i.e., 
Aqualia, Agbar and Others. 
6. Results 
The results for the estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables 
included in our analysis are in Table 3. The model is jointly significant and the 
goodness-of-fit is high compared to other studies conducting logistic regressions. 
 
 
 
ln
Probability Yi  Firm m 
Probability Yi  Firm Others 





  m  mkk1
K Municipality i  mhh1H Politicali
16 
 
Table 3.- Multinomial logistic regression: Estimated marginal effects 
 Aqualia Agbar Others 
Population 2.96e-7 (0.869) 2.73e-6 (0.126) -3.03e-6 (0.311) 
Economic activity 1.28e-4 (0.870) 7.88e-4 (0.308) 6.60e-4 (0.584) 
Andalusia 0.013 (0.915) -0.222 (0.083)* 0.209 (0.279) 
Aragon -0.293 (0.076)* -0.060 (0.700) 0.354 (0.088)* 
Asturias 1.079 (0.000)*** 1.294 (0.000)*** -2.379 (0.000)*** 
Balearic Islands -0.086 (0.643) -0.446 (0.061)* 0.534 (0.017)** 
Basque Country 1.085 (0.000)*** 1.250 (0.000)*** -2.343 (0.000)*** 
Cantabria -0.340 (0.037)** -0.203 (0.202) 0.543 (0.007)*** 
Castile-La Mancha -0.085 (0.514) -0.227 (0.085)* 0.313 (0.103) 
Castile and León -0.086 (0.550) 0.100 (0.488) -0.014 (0.948) 
Catalonia -0.328 (0.016)** 0.029 (0.821) 0.298 (0.135) 
Extremadura -0.071 (0.602) -0.214 (0.127) 0.286 (0.148) 
Galicia -0.353 (0.016)** -0.065 (0.642) 0.418 (0.034)** 
Madrid 1.357 (0.000)*** -3.193 (0.000)*** 1.836 (0.000)*** 
Murcia -0.110 (0.449) -0.199 (0.174) 0.310 (0.131) 
La Rioja 0.088 (0.671) -0.233 (0.348) 0.145 (0.606) 
Valencian Community  -0.388 (0.005)*** -0.216 (0.110) 0.605 (0.002)*** 
Political variables    
PSOE 0.058 (0.205) -0.070 (0.114) 0.017 (0.778) 
PP 0.095 (0.062)* -0.148 (0.003)*** 0.053 (0.233) 
Majority -0.045 (0.177) -0.017 (0.597) 0.066 (0.060)* 
Continuity 0.057 (0.104) 0.019 (0.556) -0.077 (0.012)** 
Observations 892 
Log likelihood -837.37 
LR Chi-squared 4,752.95 (0.000)*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1453 
Note: p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** mean statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
As for the results, control variables Population and Economic activity are not 
significant at standard confidence levels. The set of regional variables reflects the 
greater relative presence of some companies in certain areas of Spain. This may be 
due to a business strategy phenomenon: companies that are the first to enter a 
particular area may have an advantage for business expansion in that area. This 
could be facilitated by a better understanding of the area, and/or by an emulation 
effect, whereby municipalities tend to follow the behavior of their neighbors. 
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The political variables Majority and Continuity are significant, although with 
different signs, for the group Others. Governments of political parties that enjoy a 
majority have a higher probability of choosing firms other than Agbar and Aqualia. 
Furthermore, governments that have been re-elected are less inclined to contract 
with firms other than the two major ones. Perhaps the extended period spent in 
local government facilitates the creation of networks that ultimately promote the 
awarding of contracts to the major firms. 
Our main focus is on the variables representing the political party ruling the local 
government at the time when privatization took place, which allow us to test the 
main hypothesis. In this sense, we obtain diverging evidence related to the 
relationship between political parties and firms. In the first place, the marginal 
effects of the variable PSOE are not statistically significant at standard confidence 
levels, suggesting that there is no systematic relationship between municipalities 
governed by this political party and any particular company. In other words, we 
find no statistical evidence, at countrywide level, of favoritism by the PSOE to any 
company managing water services in Spain. On the contrary, in the case of PP we 
do obtain statistically significant evidence of potential favoritism. Accordingly, 
the probability of Agbar being awarded the contract for the management of urban 
water services is 14.8 percent lower when the municipality is governed by PP. In 
contrast, the probability of Aqualia being awarded the contract is 9.5 percent 
higher with a local government ruled by PP. 
Are these relationships mere coincidence? Or, on the contrary, are they the result 
of favoritism or discrimination based on the different behavior of the water 
delivery firms with respect to funding the Popular Party? In this respect, we 
believe it is striking that the company showing a significant association with 
water service concessions made by PP-governed municipalities, the holding 
company FCC, has been the second biggest donor to that party in the past decade. 
It is also striking that several major PP politicians have come to occupy seats on 
the FCC Board of Directors after leaving their institutional responsibilities. 
Conversely, the company Agbar, which showed a significant negative association 
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with the concessions for water services granted by PP-governed municipalities, is 
not among the list of donors to the PP, nor were prominent members of the PP 
appointed to its Board of Directors. 
Of course, showing favoritism to particular firms in local concessions can be the 
result of atomized decisions by local governments seeking rents or other 
compensation. In fact, cases under judiciary review in provinces such as A 
Coruña, Asturias or Huelva involve municipalities governed by different political 
parties, within each province (see footnote above). But beyond these atomized 
irregular decisions, our results suggest that higher-level decisions based on the 
company's political connections and political party funding at the national level 
might have played a significant role in the awarding of water concessions in 
Spain over the last three decades. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
Contracting out of public services is an area of public policy in which political 
corruption is commonplace. In exchange for bribes or other favors to 
policymakers or top bureaucratic managers, private firms can make sure they are 
awarded a contract. Furthermore, the systematic implementation of these 
practices can be used as a way of funding electoral activity or political party 
machinery. Eradicating such practices would undoubtedly be in the public 
interest. However, a problem associated with the adoption of remedial measures 
is the lack of precise knowledge of the extent of these practices; since these are 
illegal practices, they are systematically hidden. 
In this research we analyze the existence of a potential relationship between 
political parties in governments that award contracts, and private firms that 
secure these contracts. The context of our study is the widespread concern over 
corruption in Spain, where many cases of public services procurement are subject 
to judiciary investigations. We sought to understand whether the biases in favor 
of a specific firm –taken as a proxy for favoritism; or the opposite, if against– are 
only isolated events or, alternatively, whether they might be part of a more 
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complex network of decision-making aimed either at financing political parties, 
and/or to rewarding firms’ political connections. In order to understand this, we 
look for statistically significant relationships between political parties in local 
government and firms awarded contracts for provision of public services, which 
could suggest systematic favorable (or contrarian) treatment. 
The results we have obtained suggest the existence of political favoritism shown 
by a political party to one of the leading business groups with interests in the 
water industry. City councils governed by the Popular Party are more likely to 
award the service contract to the company Aqualia, and are also less likely to 
award it to Agbar –Aqualia's main competitor. Our results are consistent with the 
facts that, as proven in judiciary investigations, the owner of Aqualia –Fomento de 
Construcciones y Contratas– was the second largest donor of funds to the Popular 
Party between 2002 and 2009. On the contrary, neither Agbar nor its owner 
company –Suez Environment– have appeared in the lists of donors to the Popular 
Party. Furthermore, it is publicly known that several politicians that enjoyed high 
positions of office, including national ministries and regional ministries, in 
Popular Party governments, have regularly occupied positions on the Board of 
Directors of Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (after leaving institutional 
office), whereas no former national minister or regional minister (neither from the 
Popular Party nor from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) has been a member 
of the Board of Directors of Agbar or Suez Environment in the period we study. 
The results from our research can be interpreted as evidence supporting the need 
for changes to the regulatory and institutional framework in Spain. They are 
consistent with perceptions of corruption showed by indicators developed by 
Transparency International and the RAND Corporation. Improving the regulation 
of political parties’ funding, as well as delivering faster and tougher sanctions in 
proven cases of corruption, could reduce the temptation to engage in illegal 
practices. Additionally, ensuring greater transparency in public procurement 
processes, and building more effective mechanisms to monitor the contracting 
process, would make it more difficult to engage in favoritism (or discrimination) 
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when awarding public contracts. Of course, governments and legislators are 
responsible for introducing measures that aim to achieve such improvements. 
Unfortunately, giving up the possibility of obtaining political rents might be a too 
strong a disincentive to do so. 
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